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ABSTRACT 
 
Critical Race Theory (CRT), grounded in American legal theories of power 
and dominance, has been increasingly applied to other countries to analyse 
racialised power relationships between social groups. Applying CRT to 
Japanese society, where "racism" is officially denied as a factor in the 
systemic differentiation of peoples into a dominant majority and 
disenfranchised minorities, nevertheless reveals racialised paradigms 
behind deciding who is a "member" of society (as in a citizen) and who is 
not (as in, a non-citizen), systematically allocating privilege to people with 
"Japanese blood." This research focuses on recent changes to Japan's 
official registry systems vis-à-vis non-citizens. Historically, the Family 
Registry (koseki) and the Resident Registry (jūmin kihon daichō) have 
employed biological conceits to give systemic advantages (in terms of 
citizenship, employment, access to social welfare and official recognition 
as residents and family members) to "Wajin" (Japan's dominant social 
group with "Japanese blood") over "Non-Wajin." Although the Resident 
Registry system was amended in July 2012 to allow equal registry of non-
citizens, this research finds under CRT methodology that the dominant 
Wajin majority did not further enfranchise or cede power to the 
disenfranchised non-citizen minority. The reforms were merely cosmetic 
changes to a segregating system that remains largely intact in scope and 
enforcement.  
 
Keywords:  Critical Race Theory, racism, Japan, nationality law, Wajin, 
Whiteness studies  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On 9 July 2012, Japan formally abolished its Postwar Alien Registration 
System (gaikokujin tōroku seido), instituted in 1952 at the close of the 
Allied Occupation (1945−1952) to keep track of non-citizens within its 
borders.  Doing so not only involved the abolition of the Alien Registration 
Law (gaikokujin tōroku hō), but also involved a fundamental reform of its 
Resident Registry (jūmin kihon daichō) system, designed to keep official 
track of the addresses and family members within domiciles in Japan. The 
Resident Registry hitherto did not allow non-citizens to be listed on 
Residency Certificates (jūminhyō) with Japanese family members as 
residents or official members of the family unit. Now this is possible. 
Although a step towards granting more official recognition of non-citizens 
as equal members of Japanese society, this research will explore whether 
these changes occurred for the officially-stated reasons—e.g., for the sake 
of the officially-stated altruism of giving foreigners more "convenience" 
through streamlined bureaucratic procedures1—or whether, as per the 
racially-grounded methodology of Critical Race Theory (CRT), there was 
an "interest convergence" prompting the dominant majority within 
Japanese society to cede a degree of its power to a disenfranchised 
minority.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
  
CRT sees racism as a study of power relations within a society, particularly 
in terms of how people are rendered into hierarchical categories of power, 
social dominance and wealth acquisition.2 Fundamental theories 
synthesising economic and postcolonial arguments have a long history, 
going back to DuBois.3  DuBois at the beginning of the twentieth century 
linked the abolition of American slavery with the convergence of White 
economic and postcolonial interests, as opposed to the narrative of 
American society being convinced by "moral good" and "just society" 
arguments. CRT first appeared in American academic legal studies in the 
1970s, in response to perceived shortcomings within the American Civil 
Rights Movement, grounded in minority frustrations at being 
underrepresented within American public discourse and academia.4  
Incorporating various criticisms from Ethnic Studies, Women's Studies, 
Cultural Nationalism, Critical Legal Studies, Marxism and Neo-Marxism, 
and Internal Colonial models,5 CRT has expanded out of deconstructing 
legal and judicial processes and into other fields, including deconstructions 
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of education, public discourse, gender, ethnicity, class and poverty, 
globalisation, immigration and international labour migration, hate speech, 
the meritocracy and identity politics. CRT has also been expanded beyond 
America's borders to examine postcolonialism and power structures in 
other societies, including Great Britain, Israel and Europe.6 This article will 
similarly expand CRT into Japanese Studies. 
 In terms of analysing the racialised structural relationships of social 
power, CRT may not only be applied to Japan, but also to any society. CRT 
starts from the fundamental standpoints7 that, inter alia: 1) "race" is purely 
a social construct without inherent physiological or biological meaning, so 
it is open to the same perceptional distortions and manipulations as any 
other social convention or ideology; 2) the prejudicial discourses about 
human categorisation and treatment are so hegemonic that they become 
part of the "normal" in society, i.e., that is to say, so embedded in the 
everyday workings of society that they give rise to discriminatory actions 
(both conscious and unconscious), resulting in discriminatory public 
policies and laws regardless of policymaker intentions; 3) such illusory 
perceptions of "race" are in fact the central, endemic and permanent driving 
force behind organising the scaffolding of human interaction, 
categorisation and regulation, both at the individual and more poignantly 
the legislative level; 4) "race" thus fundamentally influences, even grounds, 
the formation, enforcement and amendment process of a society's laws; 5) 
those who best understand this dynamic and its effects are the people 
disadvantaged within the racialised structure of power and privilege, and 
thus are necessarily excluded from the discourse regarding the organisation 
of society; and, consequently 6) one must also recognise the power of 
minority narratives as a means to allow more minority voices and 
alternative insights into the discussion, to expose the realities present for 
the unprivileged and underprivileged.8 
 The dynamic of racism under CRT is one of power and self-
perpetuation of the status quo. Racism, as a process of differentiating, 
"othering," and subordinating a majority group over a minority group in a 
society or a nation-state,9 is seen as necessarily existing to advance and 
promote, both materially and psychologically, the interests and privileges 
of members within the dominant power structure.  In America's case, CRT 
helped foster "Whiteness Studies" to examine the power and preference 
(e.g., material wealth, prestige, privilege, opportunity, etc.) that both 
naturally and not-so-naturally accrues to the White majority or elite.  Due 
to the "normalisation" of this dynamic, it becomes embedded and self-
perpetuating, where even the most well-intentioned members of the elite 
will have little awareness or incentive to eliminate this system (due in part 
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to "structural determinism,"10 i.e., the milieu in which people have been 
raised and live their lives necessarily makes them blind to the viewpoints 
and needs of people who have not). Under CRT, the only time power may 
be ceded to non-dominant peoples is when there is "interest convergence," 
i.e., when the dominant majority and minorities both stand to gain from a 
policy shift; then current racial paradigms will be discarded and shifted 
instead to disfavour another weakened, easily-targeted disenfranchised 
minority.11  In this sense of being the root of social power relationships, 
racisms and racialisms will shift over time, but they will nevertheless 
continue to exist and remain a fundamental ordering force within a 
society.12 
 
 
THE INSIGHTS OF CRT AND "EMBEDDED RACISM" 
 
To enhance its analytical power, this research has been influenced by CRT 
to propose a new framework for examining discrimination in Japan:  
"Embedded Racism" (ER). Both CRT and ER shift the focus away from 
class and socioeconomic status (viewed more as a consequence of 
racialised social processes than an effect) and onto "race" as the primary 
social organiser and differentiator in political enactments and legislative 
processes.13  Both CRT and ER incorporate Postcolonial and Postmodernist 
schools of thought regarding deconstruction of national narratives and 
socially-constructed realities. They also go beyond Marxist analytical 
paradigms that tend to focus more on class due to economic status, less on 
the social construction and effects of racialised phenotypes in a society.14 
The CRT framework enables the scholar to understand contexts grounded 
in "political events, personal histories, societal norms, and laws and 
policies that affect the primary setting."15 However, ER's contribution of 
knowledge to the field is that it advocates a universal application of 
methodology, avoiding "culturally-based" explanations of behaviour and 
policy outcomes (e.g., "Japanese do this because they are Japanese"). That 
is to say, by putting contexts in a mysterious "culture box," one tends to 
ignore universal paradigms of the racialisation process in favour of treating 
Japan's racism as "exceptional" or "unique" (therefore exempt from 
analysis under universal concepts of human rights). ER in particular 
synthesises the structural inequalities reinforced under Essed's concept of 
"everyday racism"16 with Sue's unconscious social "othering" of 
"microaggressions,"17 and underscores how both the law and the practice of 
law in a society reflect both conscious and unconscious bias in the past, 
present and future. CRT and ER view racialisation processes worldwide as 
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the "central, endemic and permanent" ordering force in terms of power 
relationships behind the construction of any society18—particularly how the 
process of differentiation, othering and subordination of peoples is 
expressed, normalised, and embedded in law and order.  
 Like CRT, ER also forces introspection on the part of the scholar. As 
Chapman (157) writes, CRT "allows scholars to interrogate social, 
educational and political issues by prioritising the voices of participants 
and respecting the multiple roles held by scholars of colour when 
conducting research" (emphasis mine)—in the case of this dissertation, the 
role(s) a Caucasian (i.e., the author) in Japan's "Japanese"-dominated 
society. In every human society, nobody escapes racialisation (i.e., all 
people, including scholars, fall into a racial category), which means that the 
racial category the researcher her or himself falls into will inevitably 
influence the data set: How the researcher sees the subject, and how the 
subject sees the researcher, may change not only the answer to a question 
but also how the question is asked—or even if the question is asked at all. 
Under CRT, questions of objectivity in social science are suitably raised, 
problematised and attempted to be accounted for properly under race-based 
paradigms. As Pillow notes,19 inquiry through race-based methodologies 
"push the boundaries of what is acceptable to do and talk about in 
research;" they "repeatedly challenge the belief that our scientific practices 
and theories are somehow neutral, and lay a foundation for examining the 
epistemological foundations of research and developing alternative 
epistemological frameworks" (186). In short, critical theory models such as 
CRT have been created "because existing theoretical models and 
methodological discussions are insufficient to explain the complexity of 
racialised histories, lives and communities" (ibid). 
 CRT has been applied primarily to American society and racialised 
hierarchies within. Nevertheless, this research argues that under ER, the 
same racialising dynamics can be seen in Japan after substituting group 
"White" with "Japanese."20 That said, when transposed upon the Japanese 
context, the terminology on "race" and "racism" in the discussion is not an 
exact match: For example, "Japanese" as a term is confusing, as it can 
mean both "a Japanese citizen" (a legal status which can include people of 
different races and ethnic backgrounds), and "a Japanese by blood" (a 
racialised paradigm which can include people who do not have Japanese 
citizenship). The term also overlooks those who are "Japanese" (such as the 
Burakumin) who have citizenship, physical appearance, and full 
acculturation and phenotype as "Japanese," yet suffer from discrimination 
by descent and social origin when further background checks are 
conducted.  So for the purposes of this research, a new term is necessary to 
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enhance the contours of power relations within Japan's social groupings: 
"Wajin." 
 
 
"WAJIN":  THE DOMINANT MAJORITY GROUP IN JAPAN 
  
Wajin is a term used in contemporary scholarship on Hokkaidō's 
indigenous people, the Ainu, to differentiate them from their nineteenth-
century Japanese colonisers and present-day "Japanese."21 Wajin has also 
been used by the Japanese government as a self-identifier,22 a racialised 
term to divide "Japanese" into two putative races, "Ainu" and "Wajin," 
even though according to Wetherall, Okinawans and "most naturalised 
Japanese… would probably not choose to classify themselves as 'Wajin'."23  
It is a word based upon birth, not legal status. 
 This article will use the term Wajin for two reasons: 1) it is a 
legitimate, non-pejorative word in modern Japanese language long used to 
describe Japanese people, even before Japan as a nation-state (or proto-
state) began colonising others; 2) it enables the author to define its meaning 
under new and flexible paradigms. Just as the term "White" can be made 
useful as both an indicator of social status and as a visual 
identifier/enforcer of those who have that social status (and allow for 
flexibility of "shades of White" as people attempt to "pass" as "White" in 
order to gain power or privilege), Wajin will also underscore the 
performative aspect of the process of differentiation, 
a) allowing for visual differentiation between people who "look Japanese" 
and "do not look Japanese"; and b) allowing for "shades" as people "pass" 
or "do not pass" as "Japanese," finding their status, privileges and 
immunities affected when they are suddenly revealed as "Non-Wajin." 
 Let us now turn to Japan's official registry systems and the systemic 
exclusion of non-citizens. 
 
 
JAPAN'S FAMILY REGISTRY SYSTEM24 
 
With the exception of Japan's royal family, all Japanese citizens are 
required to have a Family Registry (koseki) registered with the Japanese 
government (GOJ) in order to be acknowledged as citizens, according to 
the Family Registration Law (koseki hō) Articles Six and Seven. 
Additionally, according to the same law's articles and other articles passim, 
only Japanese citizens may be fully registered on koseki. Although registry 
systems exist in other countries (including the hukou in China and Taiwan, 
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the ho khau in Vietnam, the hoju in North Korea,25 the familienbuch in 
Germany, the livret de famille in France, the libro de familia in Spain, etc.), 
Bryant26 notes that Japan's system is grounded in paradigms not found in 
other societies. Many countries effectively compile "dossiers" on their 
citizens (and non-citizens), but they are dossiers on individuals. However, 
only Japan in the world (and Taiwan, which received the system under 
Japanese colonisation) has a system predicated upon the notion of the 
citizen as a member of a family unit. This is different from Occidental 
notions of state power; according to Levin,27 Anglo-European state/society 
relations are based on the historical notion of a social contract between and 
individual serf and his lord; Japan's nation-state, however, is based on the 
notion of a contract between a familial head of household and their lord, 
putting potentially more intrusive means of social control at the disposal of 
lower levels of society. Thus, the Japanese State intrinsically has an interest 
not only in "upright" individuals, but also in "upright" families.28 The 
further systematic exclusion of non-citizens (already selected by racialised 
jus sanguinis paradigms) from the Japanese family unit in terms of registry 
therefore creates and further reifies the Wajin/Non-Wajin dichotomy. 
 Let us use a practical example to illustrate:29 As can be seen in 
documents available for public view below, between 1989 and 2000 an 
American named David Aldwinckle was married to a Japanese citizen 
named Sugawara Ayako as a foreigner. They have two daughters, 
automatically granted Japanese citizenship through blood ties with their 
Japanese mother under the Nationality Law. Here is how the 
Aldwinckle/Sugawara family was rendered on a copy of her Family 
Register, or koseki tōhon, dated 20 September 1999 (Figure 1): 
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Figure 1:  A sample koseki tōhon, dated 20 September 1999, issued by Sapporo Nishi-
ku Ward Office, redacted, and annotated by Debito Arudou and used with 
permission. 
 
 Let us translate sections of the koseki. On the bottom right-hand 
column is koseki holder Sugawara Ayako's married and maiden names.  
The top half of the koseki (rendered in this form until 2011) describes 
family history, with the non-redacted sections indicating that Sugawara 
married David Christopher Aldwinckle on 28 June 1989; they had two 
children named Ami and Anna (in their own separate sections in the left 
half of the koseki); listed below are birthdates and birthplaces and other 
private details. Thus the koseki notes marriage and parentage. However, the 
legalised exclusionism of non-citizens is found in the section denoted as 
"wife" (tsuma), as there is no "husband" (otto) listed in this family unit. If 
this were a marriage between two Japanese citizens, there would be an 
additional column provided with Aldwinckle's name rendered in a separate 
section (as Aldwinckle's children are) and denoted as "husband," thus 
establishing a clear household unit (setai), and the opportunity for either 
the husband or wife to be Head of Household (setai nushi). However, for 
an international marriage in Japan, the non-citizen is officially not 
considered part of the household, so to the untrained eye (i.e., readers not 
looking for an explicit listing within the upper text of a death or divorce) 
this looks like the koseki of a single-parent family. 
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 In terms of power relationships under CRT, Bryant (ibid) describes 
several ways in which Japan's koseki system creates superior/subordinate 
hierarchies and disenfranchises minority voices in Japan. For example, the 
system subordinates adopted and illegitimate children, maintains 
Burakumin historical inequalities, excludes Zainichi and enfranchises 
patriarchal systems that subordinate women's identities. Reflecting the 
historical values and conceits of upper-class Japanese familial relations, the 
koseki system ultimately embeds "value-laden hierarch[ical]" relations 
throughout Japanese society, including employer-employee, teacher-
student, government-governed, male-female and even greater or lesser 
economic opportunity based upon historical/familial background." It fosters 
an institutionalisation of a meme of "the stability of the family equals the 
stability of the country," moreover constructs a majoritarian version of 
reality that categorises and labels people positively (if they are part of the 
dominant majority) and negatively if they are part of the minority or in 
support of minority views. Given how constant and systematic these 
negative labels become through time, repetition and precedent, Bryant 
argues that "[many people] have internalized the predominant view that 
negative labels reflect real distinctions intrinsic to subordinate groups 
rather than social constructions of reality" (159–160), to the point where 
many people inured to this system cannot imagine things any other way; 
moreover, many assume that similar things happen in other societies. This 
system also makes it difficult for the disenfranchised minority to garner 
public support against the system, or even claim discrimination under it—
for there is no intentional discriminator—therefore disenfranchisement 
must be due to unintended consequences (161). 
 However, three issues that Bryant's analysis of the koseki system 
overlooks are: 1) divorce and child abduction/parental alienation;  
2) registration of non-citizens in general (covered above); and 3) how the 
koseki system influences other forms of official registry of non-citizens, 
such as the jūminhyō Residency Certificate.  Issue 1 is outside the scope of 
this article, so let us now focus on issue 3, the Residency Registration 
system. 
 
 
JAPAN'S JŪMINHYŌ RESIDENCY REGISTRATION SYSTEM  
(1947–2012) 
  
Japan's residents (jūmin) are formally listed on the Basic Residency 
Register (jūmin kihon daichō) under the Basic Residency Register Law 
(jūmin kihon daichō hō) Article 1. This is separate from the Family 
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Register, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs (now 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications [Jichishō/Sōmushō]). The 
contents of the Residency Register are based upon information found in the 
koseki, which is administered by the Regional Legal Affairs Bureau 
(Hōmukyoku) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. In other 
words, one document is an official family lineage record grounded in 
spatial location (honseki), the other is an individual place of residence 
record, both maintained by local governments but administered by separate 
ministries.30 According to Basic Residency Register Law Articles 22 and 
24, when residents of Japan move house and change address, they are 
required to update their previous and current local government offices of 
their current whereabouts on a public register (they may of course move 
their koseki and jūmin registries to the same government office, but this can 
be a cumbersome process). According to Articles Six, 30 and 34 of the 
same law, a document called the Residency Certificate (jūminhyō) is issued 
as official certification of individual's whereabouts and household's 
composition. The jūminhyō, along with the koseki tōhon, is among the 
documents required as personal identification by employers, banks, credit 
agencies, taxation bureaus, law enforcement agencies and other 
government offices as clearance for official matters, meaning access to 
employment opportunities, bank accounts, lines of credit, welfare and other 
social benefits. Thus, registration within and access to these official 
documents is fundamental for life in Japan.31 
 
 
NON-CITIZENS OFFICIALLY RENDERED AS  
"INVISIBLE RESIDENTS" 
  
However, under the Basic Residency Registry Law Article 39, only people 
with Japanese nationality (i.e., listed within a koseki) were allowed to be 
listed on a jūminhyō. Non-citizens until July 2012 were required to be listed 
on a separate system in the local government offices under the Foreign 
Registry Law (gaikokujin tōroku hō) Article Four Section Three. For 
identification purposes, non-citizens were issued with a special document 
called the "Certificate of Completed Foreigner Registration" (gaikokujin 
tōroku zumi shōmeisho or tōroku genpyō kisai jikō shōmeisho), issued by 
the Immigration Bureau under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. 
The Certificate served the same function as a jūminhyō, but listed non-
citizens as individuals without ties to their Japanese households. This 
official invisibility due to extranationality becomes clearer when one looks 
at an actual jūminhyō from an international marriage (Figure 2): 
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Figure 2:   Sugawara Ayako's jūminhyō, dated 26 September 1997, issued by Sapporo 
Nishi-ku Ward Office. Redacted and annotated by Debito Arudou and used 
with permission.  
 
The top line of this jūminhyō denotes that this document is proof of 
all members of the household. However, tables within (redacted) list 
members of the household: Sugawara Ayako, Ami and Anna. However, not 
listed is the non-citizen father of the household, David Aldwinckle. In fact, 
the father, in order to be listed at all, had to make a special request of the 
Ward Office that he be listed in the only way possible for non-citizens—as 
"Actual Head of Household" (jijitsujō no setai nushi). Importantly, in terms 
of bureaucratic extralegal powers, this was permitted not because of a law 
passed by Diet legislators, but because of an "ordinance" (seirei 292) issued 
by the Ministry of Justice in 1967 as a form of official "guidance" (shidō) 
to local governments regarding the enforcement of Article 39. With a copy 
of this ordinance in hand, non-citizens were able to have their name 
officially included as part of their household certificate, handwritten by a 
local bureaucrat as a "remark" (bikō) (see arrow in Figure 2) on Sugawara's 
jūminhyō.   
 The point is that non-citizens in Japan, although resident in Japan 
and paying Residency Tax (jūminzei), until July 2012 were officially 
invisible, i.e., not listed as "residents" because Japan required Japanese 
citizenship for residency. Non-citizens were also not counted by some local 
governments as part of Japan's "population" (jinkō). For example, in Tōkyō 
Nerima-ku (see Figure 3): 
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Figure 3:  Screen capture excerpt of official tally of "Households and Population, as per 
the Basic Resident Register," as of 1 October 2008.  Courtesy of Tōkyō 
Nerima-ku Ward Office online (www.city.nerima.tokyo.jp/shiryo/jinko/ 
data/area/200810.html, accessed 23 July 2012).  
 
Note that the asterisked sentence above the chart in Figure 3 
explicitly states that non-citizens are not included in the tally.32 This 
exclusionary process is standardised and normalised: A Google search 
using the term "人口 総数には、外国人登録数を含んでいません" reveals that 
other local governments did not officially count "non-citizens" as 
"residents" in terms of households or population.   
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CONSEQUENCES OF OFFICIAL STATISTICAL INVISIBILITY 
FOR NON-CITIZENS:  PROBLEMATIC DEMOGRAPHIC 
SCIENCE 
  
This procedure of rendering non-citizens into "invisible residents" also 
affects Japan's demographic science. For example, the Yomiuri Shimbun33 
reported that a population rise in Japan in 2008 was solely due to the "rise 
in the number of repatriates and newly naturalised citizens," glibly noting, 
"The figure was based on resident registrations at municipal government 
offices and does not include foreign residents." Another example was 
found in a 2 June 200934 talk given by Takahashi Shigesato, Deputy 
Director of Japan's National Institute for Population and Social Security 
Research (Kokuritsu Shakai Hoshō Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo, fuku shochō), 
offered his prediction that "Japanese will be extinct by the year 3000."  
However, he explicitly omitted population inflows, i.e., immigration, 
meaning that people exclusive of naturalised Japanese citizens—Wajin—
were the ones being referred to as "extinct." When asked the reasoning 
behind this methodology during question time, Takahashi replied, 
"Immigration is not an option for our country. Inflows must be strictly 
controlled for fear of overpopulation." Thus, despite a country in 
demographic decrease, a sudden theoretical "overpopulation problem" was 
due to an overabundance of Non-Wajin in Japan. That is to argue, in 
essence, "more 'foreigners' means less Japan"—a political, not scientific, 
conceit. 
 Finally, when the GOJ does survey the citizen and non-citizen 
population, for example every five years in the form of the National Census 
(kokusei chōsa), demographic science along the Wajin/Non-Wajin 
dichotomy is still observed. The National Census does not survey for 
ethnicity (minzoku), only for nationality (kokuseki), meaning that 
participants can only choose one option for their social origin.35 In practice, 
this means that abovementioned naturalised citizen Debito Arudou, an 
American-Japanese, can only indicate "Japanese" (nihonjin) on the form 
despite his Non-Wajin roots. His children face the same situation, where 
their Wajin roots officially mask their ethnic American origins. Thus, this 
officially-surveyed invisibility ignores the existence of Wajin from 
international marriages with "multiethnic" origins. Of course, this 
multinational situation, as the Nationality Law (Articles 14 to 16), must be 
legally reconciled by the age of twenty with the official choice of one 
nationality (therefore, officially, one ethnicity). In sum, Japan's officially-
observed and legally-enforced invisibility of both extranationality and 
multiethnicity maintains the official national narrative of monoethnicity. 
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NON-TAXPAYING ANIMALS AND FICTIONAL CHARACTERS 
LISTED AS "HONORARY RESIDENTS"36 
  
In contrast to how non-citizens are registered, there have been cases of 
local governments "honouring" non-humans with "Honorary Residency 
Certificates" (kari jūminhyō) as publicity stunts. The most famous case was 
"Tama-chan," a sea lion found upriver at Yokohama's Tamagawa River, 
which was granted "honorary residency" in 2003 by the Nishi-ku Ward 
Office reportedly for his inspiration of hope to Yokohama residents. This 
occasioned protest by non-citizens, some of whom dressed up as sea lions 
and asked for their own jūminhyō in a public protest (their request was 
denied; Nishi-ku officials stated that the register was a national-level 
system and they could not themselves amend it to allow in non-citizens). 
Other municipalities also granted not only animals but also fictional 
characters "honorary residency," including Saitama's Niiza City (2003) to 
anime character "Mighty Atom" (tetsuwan atomu); Saitama's Kusukabe 
City (2004) to anime character "Crayon Shin-chan;" Aichi's Seiyo City 
(2008) to three local blue-eyed dolls; Hokkaido's Kushiro City (2009) to 
sea otter "Kū-chan" (2009); Tōkyō's Itabashi-ku (2010) to local household 
dogs; and Aichi's Handa City (2011) to fictional character "Gonkichi-kun."    
 
 
JAPAN'S REGISTRY SYSTEMS AND THE POTENTIAL 
EXCLUSION OF MIXED-BLOOD CITIZENS 
  
Japan's Nationality Law Articles 14 to 16 do not permit multiple 
nationalities for Japanese citizens; children of international couples 
registered in Japan have until the age of twenty to formally choose 
Japanese citizenship. However, registry systems in Japan have also 
presented a barrier to children being listed on a koseki, therefore ineligible 
for Japanese citizenship. Until 1985, citizenship could only pass through a 
Japanese-citizen father, not a Japanese-citizen mother, which disqualified 
all children from relationships between non-citizen men and Japanese-
citizen women. After 1985, the Nationality Law was amended to allow any 
children born to Japanese-citizen mothers to have Japanese citizenship 
automatically conferred. For Japanese-citizen fathers, however, getting 
official recognition of paternity continued to be an issue, as illegitimate 
children (hi chakushutsu shi) born out of wedlock to non-citizen mothers 
either had to have Japanese paternity formally acknowledged by registry at 
a government office before birth, or within 14 days of birth37 as per Article 
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49 of the Family Registry Law.38 If not, the child would not be recognised 
as a Japanese citizen. Modern methods independent of the State used to 
establish paternity, such as DNA testing, are still not officially 
recognised.39  Further complicating matters is Article 12 of the Nationality 
Law, which states that a Japanese national born in a foreign country 
acquiring foreign nationality by birth shall be denied Japanese nationality, 
unless properly registered at a GOJ registry office within three months of 
birth as per Family Registration Law Article 49. Thus, bureaucratic registry 
convenience is legally given priority over biological fact, with a special 
hurdle for mixed-blood Wajin children—for if both parents giving birth 
overseas were only Japanese citizens, Article 12 would not apply.40 
 
  
"NATIONALITY CLAUSES" AND "KOKUMIN CONCEITS":  
KOKUMIN-BASED EXCLUSIONS FROM SOCIAL WELFARE 
BENEFITS 
  
Within Japan laws, national policies and public policy papers, the words 
wagakuni ("our country"), wareware nipponjin ("we Japanese") and 
kokumin ("people of the nation," i.e., Japanese nationals) are commonly 
embedded as part of the discourse. Semantically, reasonable substitutes are 
available in the Japanese language, including shimin ("people of the city" 
or citizen), juumin ("residents"), hitobito ("people" in general), and ningen 
("human beings"); these words would include all people, if not resident 
taxpayers, regardless of nationality. However, both the choice of the word 
kokumin, etc., and the subsequent application of the dichotomous 
kokumin/gaikokujin paradigm in laws and social systems, enforce 
differentiations between citizen and non-citizen taxpayers. This in practice 
has excluded non-citizens from equal access to social benefits. 
  The most famous example of the kokumin dichotomy is within the 
Japanese Constitution itself: Article 14, the very article that forbids 
discrimination by race and social origin. The original English version 
writes, "All of the people are equal under the law" [emphasis added], while 
in the Japanese translation (the version with legal force in Japan) the word 
"people" is rendered as kokumin. Although legal precedent has established 
that human rights protections in civil court will technically apply equally to 
citizens and non-citizens,41 differences in application by nationality become 
apparent through the application of what Dower42 unequivocally calls the 
"blatantly racist… linguistic subterfuge" endemic to Japan's postwar 
Constitutional history. Dower labels it the product of "language games" in 
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translations, deliberately chosen to eliminate equal civil rights and 
protections under the law for resident non-citizens.   
 For example, the basic National Health Insurance plan is indicatively 
titled Kokumin Kenkō Hoken (emphasis mine). Despite health insurance 
being mandatory for all workers in Japan (rōdōsha) regardless of 
nationality (under the Labor Standards Law [rōdō kijun hō] and Health 
Insurance Law [kenkō hoken hō]),43 foreigners were excluded from 
Kokumin Kenkō Hoken entirely until 1982.44  Even after reforms to remove 
the requirement of nationality, the Shizuoka Prefectural Government, for 
one, continued to exclude all foreigners (including its comparatively large 
and then-growing Nikkei South American workforce) from coverage until 
the late 1990s.45  More recently, Ōita Prefecture denied welfare benefits in 
2008 to an 79-year-old Zainichi Chinese woman by claiming that Japanese 
nationality was required for social welfare; this was affirmed in 2010 by 
the Ōita District and High Courts, which ruled that welfare was not a 
"charity" for non-citizens. These rulings were finally overturned by the 
Fukuoka High Court in 2011, citing treaty obligations governing refugees 
(sic) guaranteeing treatment on par with citizens.46 Thus, the "conceit of 
kokumin" embedded within the legislative process exposes non-citizens to 
unequal treatment under Japan's law. 
 In terms of public policy, the Japanese government not only 
excludes, but overtly targets and disempowers non-citizens for unequal 
treatment specifically because they lack Japanese citizenship. For example, 
let us consider other explicit exclusions of "foreigners" from equal 
treatment under Japanese laws.  One example is employment involving the 
dispensation of public authority.    
 
 
THE "NATIONALITY CLAUSE" I:  KOKUMIN-BASED 
EXCLUSIONS FROM PUBLIC-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
  
Some employment in Japan explicitly requires Japanese nationality as a 
qualification. The "Nationality Clause" (kokuseki jōkō) is found in public-
sector job descriptions with embedded clauses such as "nihon kokumin" and 
"kokuseki o yū suru hito." It was promulgated from 1953 by the Cabinet 
Legislative Bureau as an "unwritten government decree" to bar non-citizens 
from having authority "making decisions that affect the [Japanese] public," 
or "which have a bearing on the formulation of national intention."47 This 
mandate has been interpreted broadly: As of this writing, job positions that 
require Japanese nationality include foreign-service bureaucrats, elected 
politicians and sometimes their staff, Self-Defense Forces, notary publics, 
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judges and jurors, members of boards of education, public safety officials, 
public election staff, public welfare staff, public prosecutors, Human 
Rights Bureau staff, tax collectors and firefighters.48 Non-citizens have 
been hired for other public-sector employment both at the national- and 
local-government level, but then they face a different barrier by being 
forbidden to take examinations for promotion to higher-level administrative 
positions (kanrishoku); in effect, non-citizens remained as full-time 
workers (generally on a renewable-contract basis), but never could rise to 
managers over citizens. However, by 1993, Kawasaki became the first 
major city to open up public-sector administrative posts to non-citizens 
(when Kochi Prefecture and Osaka City attempted to follow suit, the Home 
Affairs Ministry, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun pressured them to 
desist).49 By 1996, the national government relented, stating that local 
governments may decide for themselves whether they would enforce a 
Nationality Clause,50 and subsequently locales both large and small, 
including Ōsaka City, Kōchi Prefecture, Niigata's Jōetsu City and Minami 
Uonuma City,51 have opened up their hiring practices.52   
 Nevertheless, some municipalities, notably Tōkyō-to, have remained 
closed to non-citizens, illustrated famously by the case of second-
generation Zainichi Korean nurse Chong Hyang Gyun. In 1994, Chong 
sued the Tōkyō Metropolitan Government for the right to take the 
promotion exam to become a section chief of hygiene (eisei kachō). She 
lost in the Supreme Court more than a decade later, setting the first 
precedent legitimising employment discrimination by nationality.53  
Moreover, despite a high foreign population by percentage in some areas of 
Japan, many important positions that might effectively use minority voices 
and insights when dealing with minority issues, such as law enforcement, 
have been denied. Despite some further movements towards openness,54 
Japanese authorities continue to demonstrate a latent distrust of non-
citizens in "sensitive positions of trust involving public power" by 
enforcing exclusionary clauses embedded within bureaucratic rules. By 
design, this disenfranchises non-citizens from being better represented in 
public policy formation and enforcement.55   
 
 
THE "NATIONALITY CLAUSE" II:  KOKUMIN-BASED 
EXCLUSIONS FROM PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
  
Further, through the power of example and precedent, there has been a 
policy creep from the public sector into the private, similarly denying non-
citizens equal employment opportunities. For example, one non-sensitive 
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non-policing sector—education—has systematically denied non-citizens 
non-term-limited contracted employment (i.e., academic tenure) through 
perpetual gaikokujin kyōshi, gaikokujin kyōin and tokubetsu shokutaku 
positions in Japan's National and Public Universities (kokuritsu and kōritsu 
daigaku). These precedents set in influential universities were then 
similarly applied to create contract-only employment of non-citizen 
educators in Japan's private-sector universities (shiritsu daigaku).56 There 
are also cases of employment agencies (such as "Hello Work," Japan's 
official job-finding unemployment office) and other private-sector job-
placement companies permitting employers to specify "no foreigners" in 
their job advertisements.57 The practice of explicit Nationality Clauses 
within the private sector is so normalised that even the Japan Times permits 
advertisements for "Japanese only" jobs.58 This is in violation of Japan's 
Labor Standards Law (rōdō kijun hō), Article Three, which states: "An 
employer shall not engage in discriminatory treatment with respect to 
wages, working hours or other working conditions by the reason of the 
nationality, creed or social status of any worker." This is unenforced due to 
a Catch-22, i.e., the law does not apply until the person is hired—until then, 
he or she is technically not yet a "worker" protected by labour law.59     
 In sum, thanks to informal national policy created by the 
"Nationality Clause" to exclude non-citizens for public-sector work 
nationwide, precedent was set so that the private-sector could similarly 
offer non-kokumin unequal employment opportunities merely by dint of 
extranationality. Coupled with a lax enforcement of labour standards law 
banning discrimination by nationality, and a judiciary that has further 
legitimised explicit discrimination by nationality, overt job advertisements 
for "Japanese only" positions further normalise "Japanese only" practices, 
creating unstable,60 limited-term work for non-citizens in many limited 
employment sectors, and reinforcing a lack of precedent for non-citizen 
opportunities in untested job markets in Japan. 
 Thus the July 2012 reforms to Japan's registry systems offered an 
elemental paradigm shift to the racialised systems of differentiation, 
"othering," and subordination of minorities and non-citizens in Japan. What 
kind of an impact will they have? 
 
 
THE REVISIONS OF 9 JULY 2012:  PLUS ÇA CHANGE?61 
 
Japan's structural changes to its registry systems were twofold:  1) The old 
Alien Registration System (gaikokujin tōroku seido) was abolished, 
replaced with a "Residency Management System" (rairyū kanri seido) 
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centralised under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication. 
Instead of local government offices, a national-level authority replaced the 
old wallet-sized Alien Registration Cards with new computer-chipped 
wallet-sized Zairyū Cards with remotely-readable RFID technology; 2) The 
Alien Registration Law (gaikokujin tōroku hō) was formally abolished, and 
the Basic Resident Registration Act was modified to permit non-nationals 
to register on the Basic Resident Register, the same as Japanese nationals. 
After sixty years of the abovementioned unequal and undignified treatment, 
Non-Wajin were no longer officially invisible in Japanese families and 
local population tallies.62 
 However, how much has changed in practice? Limitations to 
livelihood remain through "Nationality Clauses" in public- and private-
sector employment, and visa statuses remain as restrictive as ever, even if 
for a potentially longer duration (moreover at the discretion of issuing 
authorities, with no system of appeal).63 Non-citizens are still not allowed 
to register on Family Registries with their families, meaning that the 
concept of "family" and "Japanese nationality" remain intertwined. Non-
citizens (and non-citizens only) are still required to carry a form of personal 
identification on their person at all times (jōji keitai) or face criminal 
procedures with possible arrest and fines. Also, by centralising the issuance 
of Zairyū Cards into a national agency, local and municipal governments 
(as the previous issuer of Alien Registration Cards) have lost the 
discretionary power to issue refugees and visa overstayers with temporary 
identification cards for work and welfare benefits, in effect tightening 
control over non-citizens even further.64 Regarding "convenience for 
foreigners," amendments and changes in status and address can no longer 
be made at local government offices; now applicants must visit regional 
immigration bureaus (occasioning long trips and missed work for non-
citizens in rural areas), in a shorter window of time (fourteen calendar 
days), with harsher fines (up to 200,000 yen).65 
 However, one dramatic legal change in 2012 that could have 
potentially ceded a degree of power to non-citizens was the abolition of the 
Alien Registration Law. Section 13 Clause Two of that law had enabled 
and encouraged the random stopping and questioning of "aliens" by police 
officers and other officials of the Ministry of Justice (in practice, as 
determined by sight:  i.e., racial profiling).66 For citizens, however, this 
procedure was not permitted without probable cause (sōtō na riyū), under 
the Police Execution of Duties Act (keisatsukan shokumu shikkō hō) 
Section Two Clause Two. By default, non-citizens should now in effect be 
covered by this Act, but the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition 
Act (shutsunyūkoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei hō) Section 23 now contains 
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the same embedded legal writ institutionalising spot identification checks 
for "foreigners" only, thus encouraging official racial profiling; the author 
has also heard recent reports of police subjecting Non-Wajin to random 
street identification checks to confirm legal visa status. Thus once a 
racialised legal practice becomes embedded, it remains embedded unless a 
conscious effort is made to counteract it in legal writ. This did not happen 
even after the abolition of the Alien Registration Law. 
   
 
CONCLUSION 
  
It is unclear that the July 2012 revisions constitute any substantive reform.  
Measures that were officially reported as liberalisations in the name of 
"convenience" for foreigners (e.g., updated identification cards, centralised 
bureaucratic procedures, equal registration as residents, abolished Re-Entry 
Permits, longer visa validity periods) have been offset by tighter 
bureaucratic controls, harsher penalties for violators and continued means 
for racial profiling of Non-Wajin. Aside from some cosmetic changes to 
enforcement, it is unclear in this instance, under CRT's theory of "interest 
convergence," that any measure of power has been ceded to the non-citizen 
minority.   
 However, as viewed through CRT this result is unsurprising, given 
the degree of Wajin dominance over Japanese society: The non-citizen 
minority in Japan (and in application, the Non-Wajin who cannot "pass" as 
Japanese) has long been disenfranchised to the point of legal invisibility; 
this invisibility in terms of the Family Registry system has still not 
changed. Influenced by CRT, this research argues that this gross inequality 
continues to exist in Japan, despite constitutional provisions explicitly 
forbidding discrimination by race, because of the legal and procedural 
normalisation of an "embedded racism" within Japanese society. This 
begins elementally with Japan's bloodline-based Nationality Law, extends 
into daily life through its official registry systems, and is institutionalised 
through enforcement of laws and even public- and private-sector hiring 
practices. This normalisation of differentiation, "othering," and 
subordination has created hegemonic discourses of Japan's homogeneity by 
making non-citizens and minorities officially disappear. Thus the reform of 
one segregating system (the Resident Registry) is insufficient when the 
embedded walls between Wajin and Non-Wajin in the family/citizenship 
system remain embedded and intact. 
 This issue goes beyond laws and regulations concerning the control 
of "immigrants and refugees" (which are aimed at "foreigners" in Japan) 
IJAPS, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 2014)         Debito Arudou 
 
69 
 
and into issues of protecting people, including citizens who look foreign 
(i.e., the Non-Wajin), from racialised discrimination. The legalisation of a 
racialised discourse of segregation has made Japan unable to create a 
specific law in its civil or criminal code outlawing and punishing racialised 
discrimination—despite Japan's effecting of the United Nations Convention 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1996. Consequently, many 
people who happen to be Non-Wajin Japanese citizens, particularly 
naturalised citizens and children of international marriages, are also 
potentially exposed to the normalised discrimination towards non-citizens.  
It is unclear when, or even if, an "interest convergence" between Wajin and 
Non-Wajin will ever occur to compel Wajin to cede some degree of 
privilege for the sake of Non-Wajin Japanese citizens.67   
 However, the current situation is probably not sustainable, due in 
part to demographics. Japan's aging society needs people regardless of 
blood status to keep Japan's economy vital and solvent.68 Although CRT 
dictates that racism is "the usual way society does business," what makes a 
society "work,"69 in Japan's case, Embedded Racism will be what makes 
Japanese society "not work." It is only a matter of time before the situation 
reaches a tipping point, as Japan's economy continues to shrink, and its 
Asian neighbours with their younger and more dynamic economies 
increasingly outcompete Japan in its traditional export markets. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear when "interest convergence" will happen, and if 
it will happen in time to pull Japan up from a potential economic tailspin.  
In sum, Japan's Embedded Racism that perpetually disenfranchises "the 
Other" will mean that the unconstitutional lack of legal protections for 
Japan's minorities, regardless of nationality, will continue for the 
foreseeable future. 
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